










GLOBALIZATION AND THE PRICE DECLINE 
OF ILLICIT DRUGS 
 
 
CLÁUDIA COSTA STORTI 
PAUL DE GRAUWE 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1990 











An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




GLOBALIZATION AND THE PRICE DECLINE 





Retail prices of major drugs like cocaine and heroin have declined dramatically during the last 
two decades. This price decline has tended to offset the effects of drug policies aimed at 
reducing drug use in major industrial countries. The main finding of this paper is that the 
decline in the retail prices of drugs is related to the strong decline in the intermediation 
margin (the difference between the retail and producer prices) in the drug business. We 
develop the hypothesis, and give some evidence, that globalization has been an important 
factor behind the decline of the intermediation margin. We conclude with some thoughts 
about the effects of globalization on the effectiveness of drug policies and argue that 
globalization may have increased the relative effectiveness of policies aiming at reducing the 
demand of drugs. 
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April 2007 1. Introduction 
  
In the last decades a remarkable empirical phenomenon has occurred in the drug 
markets. The retail prices of well-known hard drugs have declined spectacularly.  We 
show the evidence in figures 1 and 2. These present the price evolution (at the retail 
level) of cocaine and heroin in the US and in Europe. We observe that these prices 
have dropped from 50% to 80% since 1990.  
There is evidence that these retail price declines started before 1990, and that it also 
applies to other drugs than cocaine and heroin
1. We show some evidence for the US 
where these data have been collected for a longer time (since 1981). In this paper we 
will concentrate on the period since 1990 because that period has the most consistent 
set of data.  
How can such a spectacular price decline be explained? This is the question addressed 
in this paper. We start by presenting a very simple model of demand and supply of 
drugs, so as to identify the potential factors that can explain this price decline. We 
then formulate our hypothesis, which is that the forces of globalization are the main 
reason why drug prices have declined.  Globalization has fundamentally affected the 
drug industry in different ways. We will analyze these different mechanisms. In a 
further section we present some empirical evidence that confirm our main hypothesis.  
We conclude with a section on the policy implications of our findings.  
.  
                                                 
1 For cannabis, most widely used drug we could not find long enough time series of  prices.  
  2Figure 1: 
Retail prices of cocaine in the US and Europe 
















Retail prices of heroin in the US and Europe















Source: United Nations, World Drug Report 2006, Office on Drugs and Crime, New York 
  32. Demand and supply of drugs 
In this section we present a simple model of demand and supply in the drugs market
2. 
The purpose of this classroom model is to identify the factors that can be invoked to 
explain the large decline in the retail price of drugs. We will call the drug in this very 
simple model “cocaine”.  
Figure 3 presents demand and supply for cocaine at the retail level. We focus first on 
the supply curve. This embodies an important characteristic of the drug market i.e. 
that by far the largest part of the retail cost consists of the intermediation margin. The 
cost of producing coca leafs is a tiny fraction of the total retail cost. It is variously 
estimated to be less than 1% of the retail price (see Caulkins, et al.(2005)).  
Thus the intermediation margin constitutes by far the largest part of the retail price. 
Figure 3 does not give full credit to this feature, but only suggests this difference by 
locating the producers’ supply curve way below the retail supply curve.  
 









                                                 
2  See also Becker at al. (2005) 
  4The relation between the retail and producer (farmer) supply curves represented in 
figure 1 can be analyzed as follows. We start by writing the producer supply curve as 
a simple linear function with unit price elasticity
3:  
 
S f X P α =         ( 1 )  
where Pf is the producer price and XS is the supply of cocaine. We then write the retail 
price as follows: 
  P = Pf  +  M    M P P f + =       (2) 
 Where P is the retail price and M is the intermediation margin. We specify the latter 
as:  
  S X M M β + =       ( 3 )  
where  M  is the fixed component of the intermediation margin and  S X β  is the 
variable component of the intermediation margin.  
What are the factors affecting the intermediation margin? Let us list the most 
important ones. 
•  The risk premium. Since the distribution and sale of drugs is illegal in most 
countries and since the penalty on these activities is stiff, those who engage in 
these activities take a risk (confiscation, prison, violence.). They will only engage 
in these activities if they obtain a risk premium
4. Given the nature of the risk, this 
risk premium is likely to be large. This factor is likely to make the fixed 
component of the intermediation margin large.  
•  Efficiency of intermediation. The more efficient the intermediation process (stock 
management, transportation and distribution) the lower the costs. There is a 
potential spillover here with the risk premium: a more efficient intermediation 
reduces the number of intermediaries involved and thus reduces the risk premium.  
Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) yields: 
M X P S + + = ) ( β α         ( 4 )  
                                                 
3 This assumption of unit elasticity is made for the sake of convenience. It does not affect the nature of 
the analysis. 
4 See Kuziemko and Levitt(2003).  
  5which describes the retail supply curve. Note that the slope of the retail supply curve 
(given by α + β) will generally be different from the slope of the producer supply 
curve (given by α).  





              ( 5 )  
Equation (5) implies that if the fixed intermediation margin is high, the retail price 
elasticity can become very large. Equation (5) can be rewritten as 
S f X P
P
β +
        ( 6 )  
One can simplify (6) further by assuming that β = 0, i.e. the intermediation margin 
has only a fixed component
5. In that case we obtain the following expression for the 
price elasticity of the retail supply:  
f P
P
         ( 7 )  
i. e. the price elasticity of the retail supply curve is equal to the ratio of the retail price 
to the producer price (given that we have assumed a unit price elasticity of the 
producer supply curve)
 6. The larger is this ratio, the higher is the price elasticity of 
the retail supply curve for any given elasticity of the producer supply curve.  To 
illustrate the nature of equation (5), suppose that the retail price is 100 times higher 
than the producer price (which is the order of magnitude observed in reality
7), then 
the price elasticity of the retail supply curve will be equal to 100 (given that the 
producer supply equation has unit elasticity). Thus in the drug market the price 
elasticity of the retail supply is likely to be several orders of magnitude higher than 
the price elasticity of the producers’ supply.  
                                                 
5 This assumption makes sense as we really do not know how the supply affects the risk premium, i.e. 
we do not know whether β is positive or negative. 
6 As mentioned earlier this assumption is made for the sake of simplicity. Making a more general 
assumption will not alter the main result, i.e. that the price elasticity of the retail supply is a multiple of 
the price elasticity of the producers’ supply.  
7 See the evidence provided by Caulkins, et al. (2005) cited earlier. 
  6The retail demand curve is represented by a relatively steep curve, reflecting the 
empirical evidence that the price elasticity of demand is relatively small. There is 
evidence, however, that the price elasticity is not zero, i.e. that demand does respond 
to price (see Abt Associates(2000), Saffer and Chaloupka(1995), Dave(2004), 
Grossman(2004))
8.  
The previous theoretical analysis allows us to identify the likely causes of the large 
observed decline in retail prices. Such a decline can be due to three different causes 
•  An increased supply by producers  
•  A reduced demand by consumers 
•  A decline in the intermediation margin 
From Figure (1) it can be seen that the first two factors are unlikely to be of great 
importance. We observe from Figure (1), first, that even if the producers’ supply 
curve were to shift downwards so as to coincide with the x-axis (coca leaves would 
then have become free goods) the effect of this shift on the retail supply curve would 
be minimal, leaving the retail price of cocaine pretty much unchanged.  
Second, the massive price declines are unlikely to have been the result of declines in 
demand. These would have had to be massive also. This follows from the fact that the 
retail supply curve is relatively elastic. The latter follows from the existence of a large 
intermediation margin. Thus, in order to produce a retail price decline of 80%, a 
demand reduction should have been truly massive. We will analyze whether there is 
any empirical evidence for such a large decline of demand.  
Given that shifts in the supply and demand curves are unlikely candidates to explain 
the large observed price declines, the core of the explanation is likely to be found in 
large reductions in the intermediation margin. In other words, the large price declines 
                                                 
8 Abt Associates(2000) find a price elasticitiy of the demand (by moderate users) for heroin of -0.17 
and for cocaine of -0.26. Saffer and Chaloupka(1995) find higher price elasticities, i.e. between -1.10 to 
-0.72 for cocaine and between -1.80 and -1.60 for  heroin in the US. Dave(2004) computes the 
probability of an admission in hospital emergency departments in the US and finds that the elasticity of 
this probability is -0.27 for cocaine and -0.15 for heroin. Grossman(2004) computes similar elasticites 
and finds that these are between   -1.7 and -0.1 for cocaine and between -0.6 and +0.1 for heroin in the 
US. The price elasticities estimated by Dave and Grossman are not conventional price elastiticies. They 
do suggest, though that drug demand is sensitive to price. On the whole the evidence suggests that the 
demand for heroin and cocaine responds moderately to prices. It should be mentioned though that some 
authors find no evidence of prices sensitivity of the demand for cocaine and heroin (e.g. Ramful and 
Zhao (2003) for Australia).  
  7are likely to be due to a combination of large declines in the risk premium and large 
increases in the efficiency of the intermediation.  
In the next section we provide some empirical evidence on the evolution of the three 
factors identified in this section.  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
The way we precede in this section is as follows. We present statistical information on 
the three fundamental determinants of the retail price of drugs, i.e, on the worldwide 
production and consumption of drugs and on the intermediation margin.  
3.1 Worldwide supply of drugs.  
We supply data on the three most important drugs, cocaine, heroin and cannabis. 
Figure 4 presents data on the global production of cocaine since 1990. This 
production is concentrated in three countries Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. Fig 4 shows 
that the global production of cocaine has stagnated since 1990. The stagnating global 
production observed in figure 4 is the outcome of two opposing forces. First, the 
global coca leafs cultivation area has declined from approximately 210,000 ha in 1990 
to 160,000 ha in 2005. Second, this decline which was the result of eradication efforts 
was compensated by an increase of the average yield per ha.  
The worldwide production of opium (used to produce heroin) is shown in figure 5. 
The production of opium is concentrated in mainly three countries, Afghanistan, 
Myanmar and Laos. We observe a similar trend as in the cocaine market, i.e. a 
stagnating worldwide production. As in the case of cocaine, this trend conceals two 
opposing tendencies. On the one hand, there is a significant decline in the worldwide 
area under cultivation from more that 250,000 ha in 1990 to about 150,000 in 2005. 
On the other hand, the international efforts at eradicating the cultivation of poppy has 
been countered by an increase in the yield per ha.  
 
  8Figure 4:  Global production of cocaine (metric tons) , 1990-2005 
 
Source: United Nations, World Drug Report 2006, Office on Drugs and Crime, New York 
 
Figure  5:  Global opium production (metric tons), 1990-2005 
 
Source: United Nations, World Drug Report 2006, Office on Drugs and Crime, New York 
 
In this section we also show some evidence on other drugs than cocaine and heroin, in 
particular on cannabis. In contrast to cocaine and opium the production of cannabis is 
not regionally concentrated. Cannabis, either in the form of herb or resin, can be 
  9produced in virtually every country. According to the UN World Drug Report (2006) 
cannabis herb is cultivated in some 176 countries (p. 103). This makes the estimation 
of the worldwide production very difficult.  Nevertheless some rough indication of the 
trends in the worldwide supply can be obtained. Figure 6 shows an estimate of the 
evolution of the worldwide production of cannabis herb since the end of the 1980s. 
We observe that after a decline in the worldwide production in the 1990s, production 
has picked up again since the late 1990s. As a result in 2004/05 the production stood 
approximately 36% above the level of the late 1980s. Thus, in contrast to the cocaine 
and heroin markets, we observe an increase in the worldwide production of cannabis. 
This increase, however, remains relatively limited, amounting to less than 2% per 
year.  
To conclude this discussion of the trends in production it is useful to analyze the price 
evolution at the producer level (“farm-gate prices”). The data that can be found are 
not as comprehensive as the production data (i.e., we could not find reliable producer 
prices of cannabis over an extended period). Also, the price data typically cover only 
part of the different producing countries.  
 
Figure 6  : Estimates of global cannabis herb production 
 
Source: United Nations, World Drug Report 2006, Office on Drugs and Crime, New York 
 
  10In figure 7 we show the producer prices of coca leafs since 1990. Although yearly 
fluctuations in the three different countries can be quite different, an increasing trend 
in the producer prices can be detected from 1999 to 2005.  
The price data of opium are even scarcer. Figure 8 shows the prices of dry opium in 
Afghanistan from 1997 to early 2006. We observe a large price peak that is related to 
the war in Afghanistan. From 2003 on, prices decline forcefully. Nevertheless, over 
the whole period from 1997 to 2005 we observe an increase (almost doubling) of the 
price of dry opium. Thus, in both the coca leaf market and in the opium market the 
evidence suggests that prices have been on an upward trend.  
 
Figure 7 













Source: United Nations, World Drug Report 2006, Office on Drugs and Crime, New York 
Note: The prices of Colombia relate to cocaine paste prices 
 










3.2 Worldwide consumption of drugs 
 
Source: United Nations, World Drug Report 2006, Office on Drugs and Crime, New York 
 
 
3.2  Worldwide consumption of drugs 
In the following three figures 9-11 we present the evolution of the use of heroin, 
cocaine and cannabis in Europe and in the US. The general picture we obtain is that 
the drug use in Europe and the US has been on an upward trend since the early 1990s. 
In Europe the use of heroin and cocaine has increased faster than their worldwide use, 
while in the US the use of these same drugs has increased less fast than in the rest of 
the world. As far as cannabis is concerned, both the European and the US 
consumption levels have increased faster than world consumption.  
Thus the picture we obtain from this analysis of consumption data and from the 
previous section’s analysis of the production side is the following. The increased 
demand for drugs (at the retail level) has put upward pressure on the producer prices. 
Production, however, has not increased much (in the cases of coca and opium) 
probably because of the efforts of eradication have reduced the cultivation areas. 
However, higher yields per ha have made it possible for producers to continue to 
supply approximately the same amount of drugs in the world markets.  
  12From this analysis it appears that the sharp decline in the retail prices cannot easily be 
explained by the trends in world production and consumption. Indeed, the paradox we 
noted in the beginning is even stronger than we thought. Retail prices have declined 
dramatically despite an increase in the producer prices during the same period. This 
leads us into an analysis of the intermediation margin.  
 
Figure 9: Index of heroin use from 1992 to 2004 
  E u r o p e      U S  
   
 
Figure 10: Index of cocaine use from 1992 to 2004 
  E u r o p e      U S  
   
 
 
  13Figure 11: Index of Cannabis use 
   




3.3  The collapse of the intermediation margins 
The spectacular decline in the retail prices of cocaine and heroin can only be 
explained by what happened with the intermediation margins in these markets. We 
show the evidence about these intermediation margins in figures 12 and 13. We first 
concentrate on the margin between the retail and the wholesale price. The latter is not 
the producer price but the price paid by the dealers in the consuming markets. We will 
analyze the margin between the wholesale price and the producer price subsequently. 
Figure 12 shows the intermediation margin between the retail and wholesale prices for 
cocaine and heroin. The decline of these margins is spectacular amounting to 50% or 
more from 1990 to 2004.   
We obtain a similar result with the intermediation margins between the wholesale and 
the producer prices. We show the evidence in figure 13. When computing these 
margins we assumed that the producer prices remained constant at their 2004 levels. 
We do this because we only have fragmentary information of these producer prices 
(see previous section). We know that these prices tended to increase though. Thus we 
tend to underestimate the decline of the margin. We observe from figure 13 that the 
margin between the wholesale and producer price declined even more than the margin 
between retail and wholesale price, dropping by 60 to 80%.   
 
 
  14  Figure  12 
Margins between retail and wholesale price of cocaine 











Margin between retail and wholesale price of heroin
















Source: United Nations, World Drug Report 2006, Office on Drugs and Crime, New York 
 
From the previous evidence it can be concluded that the spectacular decline in the 
retail prices of cocaine and heroin can be explained almost exclusively by the 
spectacular declines in the intermediation margins between producers, wholesalers 
and retailers.  Thus the story that can be told about the observed decline in retail 
prices is the following. For some reason (to be analyzed in the next section) the 
intermediation margins in the cocaine and heroin markets dropped spectacularly since 
at least 1990. This had the effect of reducing retail prices substantially. The latter then 
stimulated the demand for drugs by end-users. This increased demand in turn had the 
effect of pushing up producer prices for coca leafs and opium. As the producer prices 
  15make up only a tiny fraction of the retail value of drugs (even after the decline in the 
retail prices) the second round effect of the increased producer prices in the retail 
markets were extremely small.  
 
Figure 13: 
Margin between wholesale and producer price of 












Margin between  wholesale and producer price of heroin











Source: United Nations, World Drug Report 2006, Office on Drugs and Crime, New York 
 
 
We now come to the question of why the intermediation margins declined so much, 
which leads us to the analysis of the effects of globalization on the drug market.  
 
 
  164. Globalization and the intermediation margins in the drug markets 
Our hypothesis is that globalization has worked in two ways to reduce the 
intermediation margins in the drug business. The first one is the efficiency effect of 
globalization
9. Transport costs have been reduced and the use of the new IT has 
allowed to dramatically improve the efficiency of the distribution of drugs and made 
it possible to cut on the number of intermediaries. This new IT has also made the 
communication between demand and supply safer and quicker, leading to better stock 
management, and has much improved communication among dealers. In addition, the 
explosion in the size of international trade flows has made it possible to better conceal 
the transport and the distribution of drugs. Finally, the sophistication of the 
international financial markets has greatly increased the scope for money laundering 
to remain undetected. All this has led to a decline in the cost of distributing drugs. 
The second mechanism through which globalization has lowered the intermediation 
margin is through the risk premium effect.  Globalization has opened the borders of 
many countries with a surplus of poor and low skilled workers. Richard Freeman of 
Harvard has estimated that the opening up of China, India, Russia since the 1980s has 
doubled the world supply of cheap and unskilled workers (Freeman(2005)). As a 
result, millions of “have-nots” who have little to loose, may have been attracted by the 
fantastic intermediation margins provided by the drug market. This massive entry into 
the business of transporting and distributing drugs by people who are willing to take 
risks may help to explain the decline in the risk premium.  This inflow of new 
intermediaries has had the additional effect of increasing competition in the drug 
distribution.  
It is not easy to find direct evidence for this hypothesis. There is, however, some 
indirect evidence available that tends to support the risk premium effect. This is the 
number of drug seizures observed since 1990. We show the evidence in figure 14. We 
observe that there is a dramatic increase in the worldwide seizures of heroin and 
cocaine. Since 1980 the number of worldwide seizures has increased by a factor of 10. 
(A similar phenomenon is observed with other drugs). Such an increase in seizures 
can be interpreted in two ways. First, it can be used as evidence that the effectiveness 
of law enforcement has increased. Second, it can be the result of increased trafficking. 
                                                 
9 See States (1996) and especially Naím(2005) for detailed descriptions of how globalization had 
changed the drug business.  
  17If the first hypothesis is the correct one, we should observe an increase in the 
intermediation margin. The reason is that more forceful law enforcement increases the 
risk of distributing drugs. The strongly declining margins observed in the previous 
section, however, cast doubts on this interpretation. We may then conclude that the 
large increases in drug seizures have also been influenced by  increased trafficking. 
This lends support to our hypothesis that globalization has led to an increased supply 
of individuals willing to enter the drug distribution business. It also follows that the 
large increases in drug seizures have been insufficient to curb the surge in trafficking. 
   Figure  14:  Global  drug  seizures 
    Opium  (in  heroin  equivalents) 
 
    C o c a i n e  
 
Source: United Nations, World Drug Report 2006, Office on Drugs and Crime, New York 
 
  185. Globalization and inflation 
The effect of globalization on the retail prices of drugs is not an isolated phenomenon. 
There is a large academic literature analyzing the impact of globalization on the rate 
of change of consumer prices (inflation) in general even in situations where there are 
some very strong pressures to increase inflation as during the last oil crises. There is a 
broad consensus that globalization has tended to put downward pressure on the 
consumer price indices of the industrial countries. One of the mechanisms is the 
following. Globalization has increased the intensity of competition. The new 
industries emerging in Asia compete ferociously with older industries in the 
developed countries. This tends to lower import prices and to reduce profit margins in 
the import competing industries of the developed countries. As a result the aggregate 
price levels in these countries tend to decline
10. 
Thus the way globalization affects the general price level in developed countries is 
similar to the mechanisms that operate in the drug markets. The difference is one of 
size of the effects. It is clear that the effect of globalization on the aggregate price 
indices has been much smaller than the effects on the retail prices of drugs. The IMF 
(2005) for example, estimates that globalization may have reduced inflation by 1% 
per year. When one accumulates this over a 15-year period this would amount to a 
decline of the consumer price levels of approximately 20%. This is sizable but still 
significantly lower than the 50 to 80% decline in the retail price of drugs during the 
last 15 years. It should be noted, however, that in individual markets, e.g. textile, 
computers, price declines of similar magnitude as in the drug markets have been 
recorded.  
 
6. Policy implications 
We showed that the forces of globalization have led to large declines in the retail 
prices of drugs (cocaine and heroin). This together with the evidence about the price 
elasticity of the demand for drugs suggests that globalization has contributed towards 
increasing drug use. Thus globalization has conflicted with the stated objectives of 
                                                 
10 There are other mechanisms leading to a downward pressure on the consumer prices.  In particular, 
the integration of the low wage workers of China, India and other Asian countries has exerted a 
downward pressure on wage levels in the developed countries. This has tended to reduce the rate of 
growth of consumer prices. .For an analysis of these effects see Rogoff(2004), BIS(2006), IMF World 
Economic Outlook(2006), Borio and Filardo(2006), Kohn(2006). 
  19governments in the world. Almost everywhere these governments aim at reducing 
drug use.  
These governments have followed different approaches towards achieving the 
objective of a lower drug use. A first approach consists in containing supply by law 
enforcement measures (control and interdiction of production and distribution). A 
second approach consists in undertaking measures that reduce demand for drugs 
(prevention, information and education).  
Most governments use a combination of these two types of policies. Some put more 
emphasis on supply policies while others focus more on demand policies
11.  The 
results of our paper allow us to draw a tentative conclusion on the relative 
effectiveness of these two approaches in the context of a globalized environment. This 
is that globalization has tended to make demand policies relatively more effective 
than supply policies. We show this in the context of the model of demand and supply 
of drugs in figure 15. We assume that globalization continues to induce a decline in 
the intermediation margin.  Graphically, the retail supply curve continues to shift 
downwards. As a result, demand is stimulated further. These forces of globalization 
tend to undermine the effectiveness of supply containment policies. The reason can be 
seen as follows. Supply containment policies tend to raise the margin between retail 
and producer prices. In the absence of globalization this would raise the retail supply 
curve upwards. Globalization, however, greatly reduces this upward movement, and 
on balance continues to push it downwards. The main reason follows from a paradox 
contained in supply policies: as the latter raise the intermediation margin, they 
increase the profitability of the drug business and thus they tend to attract many new 
agents seeking to capture the enlarged profit opportunities (see Becker et al(2004))
12.  
The reduced effectiveness of supply policies in a world of globalization creates the 
scope for an enhanced use of demand policies. Even if the latter are not more effective 
than before, their relative effectiveness may have increased. We show the effects of 
demand policies in figure 15 by a downward movement of the demand curve. We also 
note that the high elasticity of the retail supply curve has the effect of making this 
                                                 
11 There are other differences between governments in the use they make of  harm reduction. Some 
governments give harm reduction a central place in their overall drug policies; other governments give 
it only scant importance. The role of harm reduction in drug policies is outside the scope of this paper.  
12 Becker et al. (2004) show that if the demand of illicit drugs is relatively inelastic, interdiction and 
law enforcement will actually increase the resources devoted to the supply of drugs.  
  20shift in the demand curve relatively effective in reducing demand because it has only 
a very small impact on the price of drugs
13. These policies can be used to counteract 
the effects of globalization on the supply curve.  
This conclusion, it should be stressed, can only be tentative. More research effort 
should go toward analyzing the conditions in which demand policies can be made to 
work. In addition, our conclusion does not imply that supply containment policies 
should be abandoned.  These are likely to remain an important part of any drug policy 
aiming at reducing drug use.  
 











                                                 
13 This relative effectiveness of demand policies exists today because the margin between retail and 
producer prices is still very high. If globalization further reduces this margin, this effect would be 
reduced. We are still very far removed from this possibility, however.  
  217. Conclusion 
The retail prices of major drugs like cocaine and heroin have declined dramatically 
during the last two decades. This price decline has tended to offset the effects of drug 
policies aimed at reducing drug use in major industrial countries.  
The main finding of this paper is that the decline in the retail prices of drugs is related 
to the strong decline in the intermediation margin (the difference between the retail 
and producer prices) in the drug business. This margin has tended to decline by more 
than 50% since 1990 in the US and in Europe.  
We developed the hypothesis, and gave some evidence, that globalization has been an 
important factor behind the decline of the intermediation margin. Globalization has 
achieved this effect in two ways. We called the first one the efficiency effect of 
globalization. Lower transport costs, the use of the new IT and the enhanced 
worldwide competition have allowed to dramatically improve the efficiency of the 
distribution of drugs.  In addition, the greater efficiency of the distribution process 
had the effect of making it easier to conceal the transport and the stock management 
of drugs.  
The second mechanism through which globalization has lowered the intermediation 
margin is through the risk premium effect.  Globalization has opened the borders of 
many countries with a surplus of poor and low skilled workers. Millions of “have-
nots” who have little to loose, may have been attracted by the fantastic intermediation 
margins provided by the drug market. This massive entry into the business of 
transporting and distributing drugs by people who are willing to take risks helps to 
explain the decline in the risk premium. 
We concluded with some thoughts about the effects of globalization on the 
effectiveness of drug policies and argued that globalization may have increased the 
relative effectiveness of policies aiming at reducing the demand of drugs.   
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